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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3953 
___________ 
 
CHANG BING WANG, 
     Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                                          Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A099-928-110) 
Immigration Judge:  Susan G. Roy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 10, 2012 
Before: SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR. and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: October 11, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Chang Bing Wang is a native and citizen of China who unlawfully entered the 
United States.  An immigration judge (“IJ”) found Wang removable, and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) ordered that he be removed to China.  We will deny 
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Wang’s petition for review of that order.  
I. 
 In 2006, Wang filed an affirmative application for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.  He claimed to have suffered 
past persecution insofar as his spouse was subjected to forced IUD insertion and 
sterilization by Chinese family planning officials.  An asylum officer declined to grant 
relief and referred Wang’s application to an IJ in New York City.  After a change of 
venue was granted, removal proceedings were conducted by an IJ in Newark, New Jersey. 
Wang conceded removability and submitted a supplemental declaration in which he 
contended for the first time that he should be granted asylum because he was assaulted 
and jailed on account of his opposition to China’s coercive family planning policy.  
 The IJ made adverse credibility and corroboration determinations and denied all 
requested relief.  Regarding the adverse credibility determination, the IJ reasoned that 
“the bulk of [Wang’s] asylum claim was not raised in his original asylum application or 
before the asylum office when he was interviewed there.”  JA at 39.  The IJ compared the 
original asylum application with the supplemental declaration, which added several 
significant details to Wang’s story: 
The original basis of [Wang’s] claim is that his wife was forced 
to have an IUD inserted and, furthermore, that she was forced to 
be sterilized after the birth of their second child . . . . However, 
[Wang] then filed a supplemental statement . . . which . . . says . 
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. . that individuals broke [into] the house and not only did they 
take the wife to have an IUD inserted, but [Wang] . . . tried to 
block her and ultimately had an altercation with the family 
planning officials, was arrested, detained, [and] held at a small, 
empty cement room . . . for a period of almost seven days . . . . 
 
JA at 39-41. 
 When asked why the details in the supplemental declaration were not in the 
original asylum application, Wang vacillated:  he “thought that [those details were] in his 
asylum application originally.  Then he testified that he was not sure . . . . He then stated 
that he thought he told his attorney . . . [and] just kept trying to lay blame on his attorney.” 
 JA at 41-42.  The IJ gave no evidentiary weight to a written statement by Wang’s 
counsel, in which counsel attempted to “fall on his sword” by suggesting that he 
prevented Wang from giving a complete account of his alleged persecution in the original 
asylum application.  The IJ also noted discrepancies between the supplemental 
declaration and a 2008 letter from Wang’s spouse:  “Nowhere in her letter does she 
mention that her husband was forced to sign a confession or that he was beaten or 
interrogated for seven days or deprived of food or was in a weak physical condition when 
he was released.”  JA at 48.   
 In support of the adverse corroboration determination, the IJ gave no evidentiary 
weight to either Wang’s “sterilization certificate” or his “arrest document.”  The IJ 
referenced the 2007 State Department report, which “specifically discusses the relative 
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ease of being able to obtain fraudulent documents in China,” especially from Wang’s 
native Fujian Province.  JA at 52.  The IJ noted that “it is not necessarily believable 
objective proof that one has a sterilization certificate or even an arrest document.”  JA at 
52.  The IJ thus denied all relief and ordered Wang removed.   
 The BIA dismissed Wang’s appeal.  It agreed with the IJ’s adverse credibility 
determination and noted some of the same discrepancies among the original asylum 
application, the wife’s letter, Wang’s testimony, and the supplemental declaration.  The 
BIA expounded upon the IJ’s finding that Wang’s documentary evidence should be given 
little, if any, evidentiary weight.  It stated that the arrest document “was acquired for the 
purpose of litigation and was not prepared contemporaneously with the incident 
described,” and it was “not signed or authenticated pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(b) or by 
other means, and does not have a certificate of translation.”  JA at 3.   
 In addition, the BIA concurred in the IJ’s observation that “documentation from 
China, particularly from Fujian Province, is subject to widespread fabrication and fraud.” 
 JA at 3.  The BIA agreed with the IJ that Wang’s explanation for the new details in the 
supplemental declaration—the change in the law regarding a spouse’s eligibility for 
asylum based on China’s coercive population control program—was “unpersuasive” 
because “at the time [Wang] applied for asylum in 2006, an individual who had offered 
other resistance to the coercive population control program could establish eligibility for 
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asylum in his own right.”  JA at 2.  Wang filed this petition for review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  When the BIA issues its own 
decision, we limit our review to that decision against the backdrop of the administrative 
record.  See Demandstein v. Att’y Gen., 639 F.3d 653, 655 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  
Under the substantial evidence standard, “[w]e . . . are bound by the administrative 
findings of fact unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to arrive at a contrary 
conclusion.”  Camara v. Att’y Gen.
III. 
, 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 Wang raises two claims:  (1) the adverse credibility determination is not supported 
by substantial evidence; and (2) the BIA erred when it refused to credit the documentary 
evidence of Wang’s alleged arrest.  
 In support of his first claim, Wang contends that he “provided reasonable and 
adequate explanations for why he did not include [in his original asylum application] the 
arrest, detention and interrogation that he had suffered,” chief among those reasons being 
that originally he was only seeking asylum vis-à-vis his wife’s mistreatment and not on 
account of any direct harm.  Pet’r’s Br. at 4.   
 We find Wang’s explanation unavailing.  Like the BIA, we observe that IIRIRA—
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enacted ten years before Wang applied for asylum—“broadened the definition of refugee 
to include a person who has been [persecuted for] resistance to a coercive population 
control program.”  Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(quotation marks omitted).  Thus, Wang’s more detailed account of the events that 
transpired on May 24, 1992, if believed, provided fertile ground for a claim of past 
persecution at the time he originally applied for asylum.  Wang chose instead to pursue a 
claim that would eventually be foreclosed by our decision in Lin-Zheng.  See id.
  We also reject Wang’s second claim regarding the BIA’s treatment of certain 
documents Wang submitted to the IJ.  Wang argues that the BIA relied on mere 
“conjecture” in upholding the IJ’s finding that Wang’s abortion certificate and arrest 
record were inauthentic and thus incapable of corroborating Wang’s testimony.  We 
disagree.  The IJ relied on background materials in finding that asylum-seekers from 
 at 156 
(holding that alien cannot rely on spouse’s forced abortion to establish automatic asylum 
eligibility based on past persecution).  In any event, the BIA deferred to the IJ’s finding 
that the evolution of Wang’s claim was indicative of incredibility, especially given the 
significant discrepancies between Wang’s testimony and the letter from his wife.  We are 
not compelled to conclude otherwise, and therefore deem the adverse credibility 
determination to be supported by substantial evidence for essentially the reasons given in 
the BIA’s decision.    
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Fujian province attempt to game the immigration system with fabricated evidence of 
forced abortions and other potentially persecutory acts.  Wang offers no persuasive reason 
that would compel us to upend that finding, which was adopted by the BIA.1
 Accordingly, for the reasons given in this opinion, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
 
                                              
1 The BIA determined that the arrest document in particular was not authenticated 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(b).  A failure to comply with that regulation will not by 
itself bar evidence automatically; an asylum applicant should be given an opportunity to 
authenticate documentary evidence through other means.  Leia v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 
434 (3d Cir. 2005).  Even assuming that the IJ erred in failing to provide such an 
opportunity to Wang, we would deem that error harmless given that the adverse 
credibility determination in this case is supported by substantial evidence.  See Li Hua 
Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011). 
